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Workers and Their Performance
JOBS WERE STEADIER THAN TRAFFIC
When traffic increases substantially, the railroad companies take
on more workers, as might be expected; when it declines, some of
the jobs in the industry disappear. More men found places in it
during every expailsion of traffic for which we have any record of
employment; the number of workers decreased in every contrac-
tion except, perhaps, 1918—19 (Tables 52 and 53; Chart 75). The
average for the full year 1919'is higher than for the full year 1918
largely because the normal day was reduced to eight hours. To be
sure, train and engine employees had nominally obtained an eight-
hour day in 1917, and most other groups in 1918. Eut workers
were hard to find in those years, since many were in the armed
forces and others were attracted into war industries. Con-
sequently, the railroads kept the men they did have on the job
beyond the nominal limit and paid overtime.' When war industries
and the armed forces released manpower, it was possible to put
the shorter day into practice as something more than a system of
wage-payment. With each man working fewer hours, more workers
were needed to handle even the somewhat reduced volume
of business.
Although, in all other cases, growing traffic resulted in more,
and dwindling traffic in fewer jobs, the changes in the number of
workers were always less than proportionate to those in volume,
at least from 1908 onward (Tables 52, 53, and 54).For example,
although traffic rose 8 percent from its low point at the end of 1927
to its high point around August 1929, employment rose oniy 0.3
percent. The decline in traffic during 1937—38, 28 percent, was ac-
companied by a fall of only 21 percent in the number of jobs.
But turning points in employment usually came later than those
in traffic, at least in the cycles after 1920, in which monthly data
enable us to locate them (Chart 75). Consequently, the comparison
just made somewhat understates the scope of the fluctuations in
the number of railway workers. In 1923—24, for example, employ-
1Hines,War History..., pp.164—6.
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ment did not reach a peak until four months after April 1923 (the
high point of traffic), nor a trough until the month after June 1924
(the low point for traffic). The number of men fell from a higher
level than in April to a lower level than in June. From the workers'
point of view, it is the violence of the swings in employment that
is important, whether or not they coincide precisely with those in
traffic. Although some of these specific rises and falls were large,
even they were smaller than the specific rises and falls in traffic
units (Table 54). Employment was more stable than the volume
of railway business. Opportunities to work did not multiply as fast
as ton-miles and travel; but jobs were not lost as fast, either.
Table 52








Trafficunitsperemployee15,696 16,667 16,751 16,473 16,766 17,44917,251
permonth
% change from preceding
trough or peak
Traffic units 26.3—3.3 16.1—7.7
Employees 18.3—1.7 9.6 —6.6
aAll line-haul railways reporting to ICC.
bEstimated.Ratio in 1912 of Class I plus II plus III to Class I plus II, 1.009, ap-
plied to 1913 figure for Class I plus II roads.
We cannot be certain whether this was true before 1908. Since
we have no monthly or quarterly data on passenger-miles, we can-
--t_,_'.J •._--C_.. '.-' '—fl-c.)
The fluctuations in employmeiit were materially smaller than
those in ton-miles (Table 55). However, passenger is more stable
than freight traffic (Ch. 2); fluctuations in total traffic were there-
iore prooaoiy aiso those in is txlerex ore
possible that changes in employment were greater than those in
composite traffic. The margin between the percentage changes in
the number of workers and those in freight traffic is so wide, how-Table 53
Traffic Units, Number of Workers, and Man-hours, 1915—1921
Date 1915a 1916a 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Level of traffic units Trough Peak TroughPeak Trough
Traffic units (billions) 351.2 421.6 446.5 490.4 509.1 476.9 524.1 397.5
Av. number of employees (thousands) 1492b 1599 1647 1733 1842 1913 2023 1660
Man-hours worked (billions)' 460" 4.96 5.19 5.44 5.70 5.03 5.45 4.15
% change from preceding trough or
peak
Trafficunits - 45.0 —6.3 9.9 —24.2
Number employed 23.5 3.9 5.8 —17.9
Man-hours 23.9 —11.8 8.3 —23.9
Traffic units per
Employee(thousands) 235 264 271 283 276 249 259 239
Man-hour 76.3 85.0 86.0 90.1 89.3 94.8 96.2 95.8
Class Iline-haul railroads.
a Year ended June 30.
b Estimated in part by the ICC because.of incomplete returns.
Includes hours of workers reported on daily basis, estimated by the ICC on the assumption of a 10-hour day, 1915—18, an 8-hour day,
1919—21.Table 54
C
Traffic sand Number of Workers at Peaks and Troughs, 1921—1938
- AtTurning Points in Traffic Units
Date of tur July April June July Dec. Aug. Aug. Mar. May
1921 1923 1924 1926 1927 1929 1932 1937 1938
Levelof tru ac TroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeakTrough
Trafficunit(billions) 31.85 44.67 37.94 45.03 40.67 44.05 21.00 37.85 27.27
LTJ
Number (thcasands) 1,609b 1,871 1,744 1,800 1,701 1,706 983 1,137 903
0
change precedir g turn
Traffic 40.3—15.1 18.7 —9.7 8.3—52.3 80.2—28.0
Number r"iployed 16.3 —6.8 3.2 —5.5 0.3—42.4 15.7—20.6
—_____
—— AtTurning Points in Number of Employees
Dateof ttu: Aug. July Dec. Jan. Sept. May June June
1923 1924 1926 1929 1929 1933 1937 1938
Numberem loyeda ° 1,908 1,731 1,812 1,669 1,707 932 1,144 889
%changef:. rn number
C 4.7 —7.9 2.3 —45.4 22.7 —21.4
ClassI linc haul railways.
Three-mm h average; Jate of turn is middle month.
bAveragehJulyand only; no data for June.
'Not inable beca: :se .ackof data before July 1921.180 CHAPTER7
Railway Employees at Middle of Month, July 1921—December 1941
Thousandemployees






I I .. II_I
1921'22'23'24'25'26'27'28'29'30'31'32'33'34'35'36'37'38'39'4041
Shadedperiods are contractions in traffic units.
Table55
Ton-miles and Number of Employees, 1890—1908
Ton-miles, quarter ended %changefrom preceding peak








1893 25,24 Peak 874









1903 46.06 Peak 1,313 118.7 68.3
1904 44.49 Trough 1,296 —3.4 —1.3
1905 49.61 1,382
1906 54.29 1,521
1907 63.28 Peak 1,672 42.2 29.0
1908 51.23 Trough 1,436 —19.0 —14.1
aBabsonestimates.
bAllline-haul railways reporting to ICC.WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 181
ever, that this seems unlikely. At least, the data from 1893 to 1908
do not contradict the rule we derive from later information.
LONGER WORKING MONTH IN PROSPERITY
The railroad companies make fuller use of the potential services
of the workers on their payrolls in prosperity than in depression.
On the average a man puts in more and more time per month as
traffic grows, less and less as it diminishes. We cannot show this
for all employees, because hours worked are reported for only
about 90 percent.For this great group, however, man-hours
worked per employee per month rose during every expansion of
traffic, fell during every contraction (Chart 76).
CHART 76
Hours Worked per Month per Employee, Occupations for which Hours are
Reported, July 1921—December 1941
Hours





Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
Duringthe 1921—23 expansion the change was very irregular.
Hours per worker increased very sharply from June to August
1922, then declined almost as quickly. A strike of railway shopmen
reduced the number at work repairing equipment in July and, to
a lesser extent, in August. Apparently the companies endeavored
to offset the loss of some workers at least in part by having others
work overtime. As the effects of the strike wore off, the average
working day was shortened; hours per man were substantially182 . CHAPTER7
fewer at the peak of traffic than atithe height bf the labor troubles.
Nevertheless, the average at the traffic peak was well above the
average at the 1921 trough.2
Since the average working month lengthened in expansions and
shortened in contractions, the number of man-hours worked rose
and fell more rapidly than the number of workers. Consequently,
output of traffic units per man-hour did not increase or diminish
as rapidly as output per worker.
MAN-HOURS AND TRAFFIC
More traffic per man-hour when total volume was large
Although cyclical variations in aggregate man-hours were greater
than those in the number employed, they were nevertheless
smaller than those in traffic. From 1921 onward, the productivity
of labor, defined as traffic units per man-hour, rose in every ex-
pansion, fell in every contraction (Chart 77). Perhaps we should
qualify this generalization in view of the oscillations during 1929—
32. Beginning in February 1929, six months before the traffic peak
in August, the curve of output per man-hour falls until November
1929, then rises until July 1931 (with a mild sag in 1930—31). In
the remainder of the phase, about a year, it declines more vigor-
ously than before. Productivity in the three trough months of the
traffic contraction averaged slightly higher than in its three peak
months; but the net change was slight in comparison with the rises
during the neighboring expansions.
Some of the better defined minor fluctuations in traffic, within
its phases, are reflected in the output-input ratio. In the 1923—24
contraction, productivity, like traffic, made a partial recovery,
then declined again. Unlike traffic, it did not fall to a lower level
on the second decline than on the first, but halted at a somewhat
higher point. The three sub-cycles in traffic during the early years
of its 1932—37 expansion have analogues in the curve of output per
man-hour.
2Therewas another sharp temporary rise in February 1936. Meeting blizzard con-
ditions called for much overtime work. The unusual weather and its consequences
are described in Railway Age, 1936, Feb. 15, p. 287, Feb. 22, p. 320,March7, p.405.
The statistical technique of seasonal adjustment is designed to prevent the effects
of ordinary winter weather from appearing in the adjusted figures, but permits
those of extraordinary weather to appear.WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 183
The cyclical rise and fall in productivity would be more pro-
nounced if we could exclude from the divisor (total man-hours)
the hours devoted not to current operations but to making im-
provements in railroad property. Annual figures show that the per-
centage of wages charged to capital account became larger in every
expansion, smaller in every contraction from 1921 to 1938 (Table
56). From this fact we can fairly presume that time spent in con-
struction and similar activity grew more rapidly in each expansion.
and diminished more rapidly in each contraction than total man-
hours. Consequently, the labor chargeable to operation must have
risen and declined less rapidly than total time worked, and traffic
handled per man-hour of operating labor must have increased and
decreased by somewhat larger percentages than the data plotted
on Chart 77 would indicate.
CHART 77
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked, Occupations for which Hours












Shadedperiods are contractions in aggregate traffic units.
Annualestimates of traffic units per man-hour are feasible for
two cycles before 1921—24 (Table 53); there are no data on hours
worked before 1915. Productivity rose in the 1915—18 and 1919—20
expansions, fell in the 1920—21 contraction. In 1918—19, however,
1. u. per rn-h
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it increased; indeed it improved more rapidly than in either ex-
pansion. Apparently, therefore, this contraction was an exception
to the general rule of positive conformity to traffic.
Table 56
Percentage of Employee Compensation Charged to Additions and
Betterments, 1921—1940
ILevel of I
units I % I
1921Trough6.35
1922 I I6.52 I
1923I Peak 7.29 I
1924I Trough I7.12 I
1925
I 7.51 I





,19291 Peak I7.68 I

























Data pertain to Class I line-haul railways. Switching and terminal companies ex-
cluded in 1921 and 1922 with the aid of data in Statistics of Railways of Class I,
UnitedSIates, (Bureau of Railway Economics), p.9.
Are workers less productive when jobs are
Some writers on business cycles have expressed the opinion that
the efficiency of labor tends to decline with the progress of expan-
sion. Inexperienced hands, they argue, are taken on. Workers
become less careful in the discharge of their tasks because they
know that jobs are plentiful elsewhere; who's afraid of being fired?
busy with multiplied duties, have less time to devote
to minor matters, and their management of personnel becomes less
economical. Conversely, so the argument runs, when depression
deepens, only the more experienced and skillful workers are
retained, those who stay are more anxious to keep their jobs and
discipline improves, management has more time to devote to the
careful use of labor and materials.
If this were true in the railroad industry, we might expect the
traffic handled per man-hour to fall in expansion and rise in con-
traction. But as we have just noted, what happens is precisely the
opposite, taking each phase as a whole. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the improvement continues up to the very end of an
expansion, or that the deterioration goes on throughout a contrac-
tion. The writers who discuss the role of changes in the produc-
tivity of labor and in other factors affecting costs per unitWORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 185
of product contend that rising costs help to bring business
sion to its end, and falling costs help to bring about revival. From
this one might infer that these factors are supposed to be most
noticeable in the later stages of expansion and of contraction. Pro-
ductivity and the volume of business may move in the same di-
rection most of the time, but the former may nevertheless begin
to decline and to recover before the latter.
In that case we should expect to find a specific contraction in
productivity beginning somewhat before each peak in traffic, and
a specific expansion in productivity beginning somewhat earlier
than each trough in traffic. But actually we cannot see any clear-
cut phases in output per man-hour during the first three traffic
phases (Chart 77). What we do see later fails to support the ex-
pectation consistently. Productivity was falling at the 1929 peak
in traffic but not at the 1937 peak; it was rising at the 1932 and
1938 but not at the 1927 traffic trough.
The evidence afforded by the location of specific-cycle turning
points, however, is often dubious. Frequently the peak does not
cap a continuous rise or introduce a continuous fall. The trough
does not end a smooth downward or initiate a smooth upward
movement. Instead the curve fluctuates irregularly as it ap-
proaches or leaves the point we designate as a turn. If we depend
on a single month to indicate the direction of change before and
after it, we may obtain a false impression of the course of events.
The curve of productivity provides illustrations. After the peak of
traffic in July 1926 it is fairly flat for almost a year. We locate the
high point of output per man-hour in May 1927 and therefore find
that it lagged 10 months behind traffic. But there were only 127.3
traffic units per man-hour in May 1927; there were almost
as many—126.9——in July 1926.If May 1927(also March,
for which the ratio is 127.2) had been a trifle lower, we might have
ia we
would have found no lag.
To avoid the oversimplification that may arise from a consider-
ation of turns alone, we may divide each nhase of
into groups of months, striie an average for each group, and see
whether the averages seem to change in a consistent manner.
Months could be grouped according to various plans. In other
business cycle studies at the National Bureau, it is customary to186 CHAPTER 7
assign the months in each phase, except the peak and trough
months, to three successive groups, as nearly equal in length as
and compute averages for each. These averages, to-
gether with those for the three-month peak and trough groups,
provide a 'pattern' of each cycle which has greater regularity than
the data for individual months. This procedure is followed here.
We call the several groups of months 'stages', of which there are
9 for each cycle, numbered progressively. I is the initial trough;
II, III, and IV are successive stages of expansion; V is the peak;
VI, VII, and VIII are successive stages of contraction; IX is the
final trough. In effect the stages divide each phase into 4 succes-
sive segments. In expansion the first runs from stage I to II, the
second from II to III, and so forth. In contraction the first runs
from V to VI, the second from VI to VII, etc.
Table 57
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked: Illustrative Calculations, 1927—32
Traffic Cycle








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
INov. 1927—Jan. 1928 3122.6...Dec.15,1927
II Jan. 1928—June 1928 6128.6 6.0 Mar. 31, 1928 3.51.71
IIIJuly1928—Jan. 1929 7132.8 4.2 Oct.15,1928 6.5 0.65
IVFeb.1929—July 1929 6134.3 1.5 May 1, 1929 6.5 0.23
VJuly1929—Sept. 1929 3132.1 —2.2Aug. 15, 1929 3.5—0.63
VISept.1929—Aug. 1930 12131.7 —0.4 Feb. 28, 1930 6.5 —0.06
VII Sept. 1930—July 1931 11135.7 4.0 Feb. 15, 193111.5 0.35
VIII Aug. 1931—July 1932 12131.6 —4.1 Jan. 31, 193211.5 —0.36
IX •July 1932—Sept. 1932 3132.7 1.1 Aug. 15, 1932 6.5 0.17
Wehave divided each cycle in traffic units into stages on this
plan, and have struck an average of output per man-hour for each
stage of traffic. The computations are illustrated in Table 57,
columns 1—4. If the theory that productivity begins to deterio-
rate at some point during expansion and to improve at some point
during contraction is correct, average productivity should decline
at least from stage IV to V, i.e., in the fourth segment of expan-
Frequently one group must be one month longer or shorter than the others. We
make this the middle group.WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 187
sion, perhaps in earlier segments as well; and it should rise from
VIII to TX—in the fourth segment of contraction—or perhaps
earlier.
Table 58
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked
Averages for Successive Stages of Cycles in Traffic Units





The method of dividing a cycle into stages is illustrated in Table 57.
This was not generally true. In every segment of expansion,
output per man-hour worked most commonly rose (Table 58). It
improved in the first, second, and third segments of all 4 expan-
sions, in the fourth segment of 3. In contractions it fell in all 4 of
the first segments, in half of the second segments, in 3 of the third
and 2 of the fourth segments. In no segment of expansion were
declines more numerous than rises; in no segment of contraction
were rises more numerous than declines. Furthermore, productivity
was at its very highest in the final stage of expansion in 3
of 4 cycles.
It should be conceded that falling productivity was slightly less
uncommon toward the end of expansion, and improving produc-
tivity toward the end of contraction. The one instance of decline
in expansion occurred in the fourth segment (1927—29). In con-
tractions there was no improvement in any first segment, but there
were two instances of rise in the second; one in the third, two in
the fourth. A less than unanimous preponderance of facts con-
trary to the theory, however, is not the same thing as a preponder-
ance in support of it.
Whether we look at turning points or at stages, then, we are led
to the conclusion that productivity did not consistently decline
toward the end of an expansion in the volume of business nor did
it risc toward the end of a If the morale
of labor and management are inversely related to traffic, other
factors that are positively related to it must usually be more im-
portant.188 CHAPTER 7
Early changes in productivity more rapid
In general, however, output per man-hour improved more rapidly
in the first segment of expansion, and deteriorated faster in the
first of contraction, than in later segments (Table 59). Since our
data cover four cycles, we can make twelve comparisons between
the rate of change in a first segment and the rate of change in a later
segment, both in the same cycle and phase. Productivity rose
more rapidly in only one of the twelve later segments—the fourth
of 1921—23. The fourth stage of that phase runs from September
1922 to February 1923, and output per man-hour was probably
adversely affected by the shopmen's strike and its aftermath, so
that the rapid rise in the fourth segment may be explained in part
by the abnormally low initial level. Similarly, we can make twelve
comparisons between a first segment of a contraction and later
segments of the same contraction. In 9 of the 12, the later segment
shows either a more gradual fall in output per man-hour or an
actual rise.
Table 59
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked
Change per Month during Segments of Phases in Aggregate Traffic Units
.
Phaseof traffic units
Change per month in traffic units per man.hour











































The method of computation is illustrated in detail by Table 57.
After the transition from the first segment, however, deceler-
ation or reversal of change was less common. Comparisons between
a second and a third or fourth segment, or between a third and a
fourth, do not consistently disclose them (Table 60).WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 189
Table 60
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked: Change per Month
Number of Phases in which Specified Sequences Occurred
Expansions Contractions




or less rapid rise, in second
or less rapid rise, in third




Rise, or less rapid fall, in second
Rise, or less rapid fall, in third







in second segment, and
or less rapid rise, in third
or les3 rapid rise, in fourth
3
1
Fall in second segment, and
Rise, or less rapid fall, in third





in third segment, and
or less rapid rise, in fourth 1
Fall in third segment, and
Rise, or less rapid fall, in fourth 3
Derived from Table 59.
Early changes larger in proportion to those in traffic
The differences in the rate of change per month may suggest that
an increase in traffic during the first segment of an expansion is
likely to be accompanied by a larger rise in productivity than that
which would accompany an equal increase in traffic during a later
segment, and that a similar alteration occurs during contraction
in the relation between traffic losses and declines in productivity.
But such an inference would not necessarily be correct if
the growth (or decline) of traffic itself was progressively retarded
during a typical phase. In Chapter 6, to be sure, we found that
its growth had no general tendency to decelerate. Broadly speaking,
therefore, we must expect to find the inference proper in expan-
sions. We had no occasion in that chapter, however, to investigate
the successive rates of decline during contractions. Even in ex-
pansions there were some decelerations; allowance for them might
alter in detail the foundation for the impression suggested. To
examine the relation between changes in traffic and in productivity
we need a new kind of computation, which may be illustrated as
follows. In stage I of the 1921—24 cycle, average monthly traffic
was 31.85 billion units. In stage II traffic averaged 33.16 billion.
The increase during the first segment was 1.31 billion (33.16 —
31.85).Output per man-hour rose from 101.2 to 104.4 units (Table
58), a difference of 3.2. The improvement in productivity per bil-190 CRAPPER 7
lion-unit increment of traffic was3.2÷ 1.31 or 2.4 traffic units per
man-hour. By the same procedure we compute that the gain in
productivity per billion-unit increment of traffic during the second
segment was 6.5 units per man-hour.
Table 61
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked
Change per Billion-unit Change in Aggregate Traffic Units
Phase of traffic units First segmentSecond segmentThird segment Fourth segment
Expansions
1921—23 2.4 6.5 0.0 1.8
1924—26 1.9 3.1 1.5 1.4
1927—29 6.7 2.4 2.3 —18.3
1932—37 5.2 2.1 2.6 1.7
Contractions
1923—24 —3.5 —0.3 t —1.0
1926—27 —0.8 0.9 —1.2 —0.5
1929—32 —1.0 0.6 —0.5 0.3
1937—38 —5.5 —0.7 —0.3 2.9
f Traffic increased. Hence this segment does not present an instance of what
happens to productivity in the face of successive declines in traffic.
Table 62
Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked: Change per Billion Units of Traffic
Number of Phases in which Specified Sequences Occurred
Expansions Contractions
Rise in first segment, and Fall in first segment, and
Fall, or smaller rise, in second 2Rise, or smaller fall, in second 4
Fall,. or smaller rise, in third 4Rise, or smaller fall, in third 2t
Fall, or smaller rise, in fourth 4Rise, or smaller fall, in fourth 4
Rise in second segment, and Fall in second segment, and
Fall, or smaller rise, in third 3Rise, or smaller fall, in third it
Fall, or smaller rise, in fourth 4Rise, or smaller fall, in fourth 1
Rise in third segment, and Fall in third segment, and
Fall, or smaller rise, in fourth 3t
Derived from Table 61.
t Out of 3, not 4, possible cases.
In this particular instance comparative results for the two seg-
ments differ from those previously obtained. The increase per
month in productivity was greater in the first than in the second
(Table 59). But the increase per billion in the second exceeded
that in the first. Generally speaking, however, the improvementWORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 191
per billion, like that per month, was usually larger in the first seg-
ment of expansion than in later stretches, and the deterioration
per billion was larger in the first segment of contraction (Tables
61 and 62). Most comparisons between later segments yield similar
results in expansions, but not in contractions.
CEART 78
Revenue Ton-miles per Man-hour Worked, July 1921—June 1940, and per Man-
hour Paid For, January 1926—June 1940: Freight Train and Engine Service
Productivity in train and engine service
The work of most railroad employees contributes to the production
of both passenger-miles and ton-miles. A track gang replacing
rails, ties, or baliast on a section of line over which both freight
and trainsoperate is not in servingeither kind
oftraffic exclusively. Consequently, we are obliged to compare the
collective labor of all 'hourly' groups with the composite volume
of traffic. The hours of the men who run trains, however, can real-
vy V V
appropriatelycompare man-hours worked on freight trains with
Mileage of 'mixed' trains, containing both freight and passenger cars, is a minute
percentage of total mileage.
1921'22'23'24'25'26'27'28'29'30'31'32'33'34'35'36'37'38'39'40
Shaded periods are contractions in revenue ton-miles.192 CHAPTER 7
revenue ton-miles, and those worked on passenger trains with pas-
senger-miles 6
Table63
Revenue Ton-miles per Man-hour Worked in Freight Train and Engine
Service
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Revenue Ton-miles,
1921—1929
Dateof turn JulyApr.JuneJulyDec.Aug.
1921 1923 1924 1926 1927 1929
Level of ton-miles Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak
Months from preceding date ... 21 14 25 17 20
Ton-miles per man-hour 805b 865 909 1,041 1,0781,199
workeda
Change from preceding date
Total 60 44 132 37 121
Per month
Topeak from trough 2.9 ... 5.3... 6.0
Totrough from peak ... 3d... 2.2
aThree-monthaverage; date of turn is middle month.
bAveragefor July and August only; no data for June.
The ratio of ton-miles to man-hours of freight train crews has
increased remarkably since 1921 (Chart 78). One hour of labor was
required for about 850 ton-miles in 1921—23, about 1,450 in 1937—
38. Productivity rose perceptibly in all expansions except 1921—23,
and in two contractions, 1923—24 and 1926—27. It increased irregu-
larly during the first half of the great 1929—32 contraction also;
but toward the end it began to decline; the net result for the phase
as a whole was a loss. In 1937—38 ton-miles per man-hour de-
creased. The rise in 1926—27 was noticeably slower than in the
adjacent expansions. There was no very obvious difference be-
For freight service the man-hour data are totals for the following 'road freight'
occupations, both 'through' and 'local and way': conductors, brakemen and flag-
men, engineers and motormen, firemen and helpers. For passenger service they
include the work of conductors, assistant conductors and ticket collectors, bag-
gagemen, brakemen and flagmen, engineers and motormen, firemen and helpers.
'Straight time worked', 'overtime paid for' and 'constructive allowances' are
included. The third item represents equivalents in train and engine time of miscel-
laneous services, such as 'deadheadin.g' back from outside to home terminal when
no homebound assignment is available, attending court, etc.
Variations in labor productivity in the two services were analyzed by Gerald J.
Fischer in A Case Study of the Cyclical Behavior of and Unit Costs (ms.,
April 1941). His conclusions are similar to those presented here, although his
method of approach was somewhat different. Hehas kindly lent us his compilations
of total hours worked.WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 193
tween 1923—24 and 1924—26; Our usual method of computation,
however, yields a slower average rise in the contraction (Table 63).
Six of 7comparisonsof a phase with its following phase, there-
fore, indicate that productivity conformed positively to traffic.
The exception arises from a comparison of 1921—23 with 1923—24:
although the net effect of the highly irregular changes in the ex-
pansion was a slight rise, it was smaller in proportion to time
elapsed than the increase in the contraction.
CHART 79
Passenger-miles per Man-hour Worked, and per Man-hour Paid For:















In passenger service, unlike freight, there was no persistent up-
ward trend in productivity (Chart 79). In 1937, however, a new
high level was reached even though the volume of traffic was much
lower than at previous peaks.6 Cycles in passenger-miles were even
The trend in freight service is largely explained by the effect on hourly train
performance of the technological changes described in Chapter 4. Similar influences
affected passenger service, but were opposed by a downward trend in the traffic
itself.
I
Shaded perLods are contractions passenger—miles194 CHAPTER 7
more clearly reflected in productivity than cycles in ton-miles.
There was an increase in every expansion, a decrease in every con-
traction of travel. Even in the brief and small expansions of 1925
and 1928—29, the dowiiward slope of output per man-hourwas
interrupted by short rises.
OVERTIME AND IDLE TIME
Relatively more overtime whentrafficis heavy
Even though the man-hours required per unit of product do not
regularly increase as expansion proceeds, or decrease in contrac-
tion, perhaps the railroad companies must pay for a greater pro-
portion of expensive labor astrafficgrows, and a smaller
proportion as it diminishes. It has often been observed of business
at large that overtime work increases and declines more rapidly
than other work. Taken by itself this relation would tend to raise
costs per unit of product in expansion. Some analysts have seen
in it one of several factors which, they suppose, limit profitability
and tend to bring prosperity to an end.
CHART 80
Overtime Paid for at Punitive Rates: Percentage of Total Man-hours Worked,
All'Hourly'Workers, July 1921—December 1941
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Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
Inthe railway industry, some of the most striking fluctuations
in the ratio of overtime to total hours were not related to thecy-WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 195
clical ebb and flow Qf traffic (Chart 80). From June to September
1922, that ratio shot up very suddenly to a point never subse-
quently attained (within the period covered by our data), then
tumbled almost as abruptly, although not to its former low level.
The shopmen's strike accounts for this wild variation. As many
of their maintenance people were absent, the railroad companies
were forced to keep some of the remaining workers on duty longer,
at overtime rates. Even after the strike an accumulation of loco-
motives in need of repair provided an occasion for considerable
overtime (Chart 73). The blizzard conditions in early 1936 delayed
many trains and made it necessary to clear unusual quantities of
snow and ice from lines and yards. One result was another sharp
rise in the overtime ratio, culminating in February.
Nevertheless there was a clear general relation between the over-
time ratio and the cycles in traffic. Although the intervening dis-
turbances were great, the ratio was higher at the end of the 1921—
23 expansion than at the beginning. What the high points of 1936
lie above is a general upward movement for 1932—37. The ratio
rose in the 1924—26 expansion also. In 1927—29, to be sure, the
curve is irregular and on the whole rather flat; in the final three
months, indeed, it averaged slightly lower than in the initial
three—2.99 instead of 3.08 percent. Yet there is a definite contrast
between its course during this phase and the sharp declines in the
neighboring phases. It fell in all the contractions, and conformed
positively to cycles in traffic without exception.7
We can compare overtime in each branch of road service with
fluctuations in the corresponding kind of traffic. The ratio of over-
time hours to total hours on freight trains (Chart 81) rose sharply
in the middle of 1922, presumably because of the shopmen's strike.
Although that dispute did not involve train and engine workers,
it probably often delayed the departure of crews from their start-
ing points beyond the time when pay began, because engines were
not ready. Mechanical failures probably caused additional delays
on the road. The average speed of trains declined sharply in those
months, especially in August (Chart 40). The unusual weather in
The curve for the ratio of overtime to total hours paid/or, all 'hourly' occupa-
tions, only from January 1926, looks almost exactly like that for the ratio
to total hours worked, except that the former is slightly lower, of course, in all
months.196 CHAPTER 7
1936, by slowing trains, produced an erratic rise in the overtime
ratio.
Overtime Paid For: Percentage of Total Man-hours worked, July 1921—
June 1940, and of Total Paid For, January 1926—June 1940, Freight




The long decline from 1923 to 1932 must be a result of those
changes in plant, equipment, and methods which tended in all
phases to speed up trains. A more or less constantly increasing
percentage of the crews could complete their runs within 8 hours.
Still others could finish up in 9 rather than 10, in 10 rather than
11. Speeding up trains on runs long in terms of miles could elimi-
nate overtime even if, as quickened, the run took more than 8
hours. The rules define overtime as the excess of actual hours over
the time required to complete a run at a standard speed of 20
miles per hour for passenger and 12.5 miles for freight trains. For
example, if a freight engineer made a trip of 125 miles at an aver-
age speed of 12.5 miles an hour or more, i.e., in 10 hours or less
(including time off the locomotive at terminals), he would not
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11 hours and the time were brought down to 10, overtime pay
formerly accrued would disappear.8
CHART 82
Overtime Paid For: Percentage of Total Man-hours Worked, and of













Shaded periods are contractions in passenger—miles.
Inspite of these other influences, however, cyclical variations
in ton-miles were clearly reflected in the percentage of overtime.
It fell in all contractions; in 2 expansions it rose, in the other 2
it declined less rapidly than in adjacent phases. (The higher level
at the end of 1921—23 can hardly be attributed to the strike, the
effects of which must have disappeared by that time).
Overtime smaller percentage of totai hourspasseer
than in freight service, and its ratio to the total has been influenced
more obviously by technological changes. After rising during the
1922 strike it dechned almost continuously throughout our period
(Chart 82). Apparently the average speed of passenger trains im-
within standard working hours for such runs,
8Fora description of the rules governing overtime and time not worked see A
Survey of the Rules Governing Wage Payments in Railroad Train and Engine Service
(Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Washington, D. C., 1936), I, 1—14.Table 64
Ratio of Overtime and of Time not Worked to all Hours Paid for, Passenger Train and Engine Service
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Passenger-miles, 1922—1938
Date of turn Feb. Oct. Apr. Aug. Dec. Mar. Mar. Mar. Aug.
1922 1923 1925 1925 1928 1929 1933 1937 1938
Level of passenger-miles TroughPeak TroughPeak TroughPeakTroughPeak Trough
Months from preceding date 20 18 4 40 3 48 48 17
Overtime hours
Ratio (% of all hours)t 6.69 6.75 5.99 5.94 5,02 5.03 3.93 3.48 3.40
Change in ratio
Total 0.06 —0.76 —0.05 —0.92 0.01 —1.10 —0.45 —0.08
Per month
To peak from trough 0.003 .. —0.012 ... 0.003 ... —0.009
To trough from peak ... —0.042 ... —0.023 ... —0.023 ... —0.005
Hours not worked
Ratio (% ofall hours)f 21.6 21.2 22:6 23.0 26.1 26.1 30.2 33.0 33.5
Changein Ratio
Total —0.4 1.4 0.4 3.1 0.0 4.1 2.8 0.5
Per month
To peak from trough ... —0.020 ... 0.100 .. 0.000 ... 0.058 ...
Totrough from peak . —0.078 ... 0.078 .. 0.085 0.029
f Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.WORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 199
Little if any relation between cycles in passenger-miles and the
percentage of overtime is readily observable on the chart. But
computation by our usual method indicates positive conformity
in 6 of 7 comparisons (Table 64). The deceleration or interruption
of downward trend in expansions and the acceleration in contrac-
tions, however, were very slight. Even in the absence of noncy-
clical factors making for a falling ratio, fluctuations in the latter
would not be important. As noted in Chapter 5, considerations of
service to the public make schedules rather inflexible; con-
sequently there is little occasion for cyclical variations in the hours
consumed by the average run or in the percentage of overtime.
Relatively more unused hours paid for when traffic is light
The changes in the relative importance of overtime tend to be
counteracted, in their effect on costs per unit of business, by those
in the relative importance of time paid for but not worked. Rail-
road employees draw pay for many hours they do not spend on
railway premises. In part this is vacation time, although formal
vacations have been relatively uncommon in the industry. But
much of it arises from the inflexible nature of working assignments
on trains. Before 1926 hours paid for but not worked in freight
train and engine service were not reported. Without them the data
for other occupations are of little value for our present purpose.
Consequently we examine the ratio of time not worked to the total
paid for in oniy five phases.
Over that period as a whole it increased (Chart 83). But it rose
very slowly in 1926—27, and fluctuated irregularly without any
noticeable upward trend in 1936—37. On the other hand, it rose
vigorously in the contractions, and therefore conformed inversely
to cycles in traffic.
The conformity is explained principally by conditions govern-
ing that part of the unused hours which is paid for in connection
WithtrainservIce. A ralroad cannot so arrange its terminas,
and schedules that the run of a train will usually require exactly
a full working day. In many cases the run must be shorter. But
t hours the
porting for duty or signing off, there is nct .much he can do with
the remaininghours of the theoretical eight-hour day. Wage
contracts provide that a man must be paid for a full day, and200 CHAPTER 7
sometimes, in addition, require that he must receive specified
minimum aggregate earnings per month. When thewages for
working time only are insufficient to meet the contract require-
ments, train and engine employees in road service must be paid
for enough extra hours, not worked, to meet the
CHART 83
Man-hours Paid For but Not Worked Percentage of Total
Paid For, All 'Hourly' Workers, January 1926—December 1941
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Shaded periods are contractionstraffic units.
Inall five phases for which we have data, time paid for but not
worked in road freight service increased relatively to total time
paid for, and therefore to time worked (Chart 84). The rise in
1932—37 was slight and irregular, however, and that in 1927—29
was less rapid than in the following contractions, although not ap-
preciably different from the average rise in the precedingone. On
the whole, the ratio of not worked to paid for conformed inversely
to the cycles in ton-miles.
The curve for the ratio of unused to total hours in this service
looks very much like the curve for the speed of freight trains
(Chart 40). Because of faster movement,some trips that formerly
required, say, 10 hours now consume only 9, others last 7 instead
°Extrahours are not paid for in all cases when the run is shorter than the standard
day. Pay for work actually done is computed per hour or per mile, whichever
gives the higher total. In some cases the mileage basis yields enoughpay to equal
or exceed the daily minimum; no hours not worked are then paid for.AND PERF0nMANCE 201
of 9, still others 6 instead of 7. Higher speeds reduce the percentage
of overtime in some situations, increase the percentage of time not
worked in others, for similar reasons. Just as bringinga run that
once required well over 8 hours closer to that limit curtails or
eliminates overtime, acceleration of trips that previously took 8
hours or less creates or widens margins between the time that must
be paid for and the time actually worked. If trains formerly trav-
ersed an operating division not more than 100 miles long in 9 hours
and now cover it in only 7, each member of the traincrew must
be paid for 1 hour of time not worked instead of noneas before.
(His aggregate earnings for the trip, however, are smaller.) Ifruns
are shortened from 7 hours to 5, unused time rises from one-eighth
•to three-eighths of the total paid for. The technological changes
that encouraged the quicker completion of trips tended to raise
the percentage of hours not used in all stages of cycles in ton-miles.
The multiplication of stops and delays in expansion slowed the
rise in 1927—29 and 1932—37. The diminution of stops and ofcon-
gestion during contraction accentuated the rise in 1926—27, 1929—
36, and 1937—38.
CHART 84
Man-hours Paid For but Not Worked: Percentage of
Total Paid For, Freight Train and Engine Service,
January 1926—June 1940
Shaded period5 are in revenue ton-miles.
Percent
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In passenger service figures on time not workedare available as
early as 1921. The most impressive feature of the ratio to total
time paid for is the almost unbroken rise from 1922 to the close
of our period (Chart 85). At the beginning about 21 percent, at
the end about 33 percent of all hours paid forwere not used. Al-
though there are no continuous data on averagepassenger train
speed, one would infer from this evidence, as from the overtime
data, that it must have increased steadily.
CHART 85
Man-hours Paid For but Not Worked: Percentage of Total Paid For,













Shaded periods are contradlions in passenger-miles.
Thereseems to be little relation between the ratio and cycles
in passenger-miles. It rose in expansion and contraction alike. No
difference in pace can confidently be observed on the chart, and
a calculation indicates little conformity—3 comparisons score posi-
tive, 4 inverse (Table 64). The absence of cyclical changes proba-
bly arises from the intricate connection, discussed in Chapter 5,
between train schedules and the habits and convenience of
travelers.
The gaps between the length of tasks and the length of the noin-
inal day have no analogue in yard train and engine service or in
departments of work other than train operation. In passengerWORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 203
service there was no appreciable cyclical variation in the impor-
tance of unused hours. The inverse relation between traffic and the
percentage of time paid for but not worked in all occupations
lumped together must arise mainly from the situation in road
freight service. In the absence of technological changes tending
to accelerate trains, both the ratio for freight service and that for
all man-hours would probably not oniy rise in contraction but fall
in expansion.
HOW STABLE IS MAINTENANCE WORK?
Since railroad companies do not fully offset the deterioration of
equipment by repairs (and new acquisitions) in contraction, and
more than compensate for it in expansion (Ch. 6) one might sup-
pose that the use of materials and labor in maintenance of cars
and engines would decline relatively to current wear and tear in
the former and rise in the latter. Presumably damage to vehicles
is roughly proportional to the miles they travel. If mileage were
closely related to traffic, the argument would lead us to expect
that the expenditure of labor and materials would rise faster than
traffic in expansion and fall faster in contraction. If this were true
and if a similar situation prevailed in other industries, such per-
verse flexibility of maintenance policy would be a factor of some
consequence in intensifying the amplitude of business cycles. For
an initial change in the volume of patronage received by enter-
prises would lead to a disproportionate change in the employment
of maintenance workers and in the consumption of commodities
used in repairs.
Actually, however, the mileage of equipment does not rise or
fall in proportion to traffic (Ch. 4 and 5). Diminishing business is
likely to be accompanied by more, increasing business by fewer
vehicle miles per traffic unit. Wear and tear, then, would not be
augmented or abated in proportion to rises and declines in traffic.
The number of vehicles rendered unserviceable probably does not
increase or decrease in proportion to traffic. The smaller amplitude
of fluctuations in that number might counteract in some degree
the rise and fall in the percentage of needed repairs performed.
On the other hand, vehicles deteriorate even when they are not
in use.204 CHAPTER 7
Careof equipment, moreover, is only one part of maintenance
work. Large quantities of materials and effort are required to keep
the roadway and structures in sound condition. And there is reason
to believe that some of these expenditures, at least, are but loosely
related to traffic. Weather is an important factor. Rain continues
to nibble away at embankments and wash soil into ditches whether
the volume of business is great or small. In this department the
work called for might increase relatively to falling traffic and
diminish relatively to rising traffic. On the other hand, standards
of maintenance could be raised or lowered. The roadbed could be
allowed to become somewhat rougher when revenues were de-
clining and less money was available; it could be made smoother
when the companies grew more prosperous.
We have no adequate data on the quantity of materials used in
maintenance. We do have figures, however, on man-hours of
maintenance labor, which we can divide by traffic units. The
quotient might be called 'labor requirements per unit'. In form it
is the reverse of the ratios we have previously considered, which
pertained to traffic units per man-hour. When we were dealing
with 90 percent of all workers or with those directly engaged in
handling traffic, it seemed natural to speak of that traffic as their
product, although factors other than the labor directly involved,
of course, contribute to any product. But this manner of speaking
is less appropriate when we are discussing a minority (although a
large minority) of workers who do not participate in the actual
movement of goods and passengers.
On the whole, the facts do not seem to support the thesis of
perverse flexibility. In all expansions, man-hours of maintenance
work per unit of traffic diminished (Chart 86). In two contractions
the ratio shows a net rise; in the other two it declined, but in one
of these, comparison with adjoining phases indicates a less rapid
fall than in expansion (Table 65). On the whole, maintenance work
tended to decline relatively to traffic in expansion, and to increase
relatively to traffic in contraction.
This conclusion becomes more remarkable when we remember
that the man-hour statistics include some labor devoted to capital
improvements rather than to current operations, and that the
ratio of construction work to all work tends to rise and fall with
traffic. The data on wages charged to improvement suggest, it isWORKERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 205
true, that the fluctuation in the percentage of all man-hours de-
voted to non-operating purposes is not large. But probably most
such workers are classified in the maintenance groups. The per-
centage of their hours to total 'maintenance' man-hours must
fluctuate considerably more than the ratios in Table 56. Yet de-
spite this inflation of the statistics in expansion and their deflation
in contraction, 'maintenance' man-hours tend to vary less than
traffic. If the labor charged to capital accounts could be excluded
from thefigures,the inverse conformity of hours required
per traffic unit would appear more decided than it does in Chart
86.
CHART 86
Man-hours Paid For in Maintenance Work per 100,000 Traffic Units,
July 1921—December 1938
Before we conclude that unit maintenance labor requirements
are inversely related to traffic, however, we should note that the
course of the ratio within a phase was sometimes quite erratic. In
1921—23, for example, it fluctuated violently although the net
M-h per 100,000 t. u.
Shaded periods are contractioss in traffic units.Table 65
Maintenance Man-hours Paid for per 100,000 Traffic Units
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units, 1921—1938


















Level of traffic units TroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeak TroughPeakTrough
Months from preceding date's . 20 36 55 14
Man-hours per 100,000 traffic 5100 468 476 426 435 408 352 289 275
Change from preceding date
Total
Per month
To peak from trougha
To trough from peaka












a Shownonly when needed to determine conformity.
b Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.
Average for July and August only.
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result for the phase as a whole was a fall. The sharp decline in July
1922 reflects the shopmen's strike; the other large irregularities
are not as easily accounted for. There were notable perturbations
in other phases also. Generally speaking, computations based on
the end-stages of a phase are more helpful in disentangling the
effect of cyclical fluctuation in traffic from that of other influences,
because the differences in traffic itself are greatest and presumably
most telling when measured between those points. Nevertheless,
the large variation here within phases should make us somewhat
chary of concluding that the amplitude of fluctuations in mainte-
nance hours is likely to be less than that of those in traffic. But
they hardly support .the opposite conclusion. The evidence is that
this kind of work is not regularly more variable than traffic.
The persistent downward trend in maintenance man-hours per
unit perhaps deserves a little explanation. Some technological
changes tended to minimize the deterioration of plant and equip-
ment. Others enabled maintenance forces to make repairs with
less effort.10
Burying drain pipe along particularly wet sections of track, and
the growing practice of screening accumulated dirt out of ballast,
prevented soggy spots in summer and upheaval by frost in winter.
Impregnating cross-ties with preservatives against decay before
they were laid, and the use of less abrasive tie-plates reduced the
number of replacements. Traffic punishes rails most severely at
their ends; treatment by heat at the rolling mills or after place-
ment in the track made the ends more resistant. Reconstruction
of battered ends by welding in place deferred the need for removal.
Control of heat in manufacture, beginning about 1933, prevented
the development of transverse fissures." Lubricators at curves
reduced the sharp wear of rails and wheels. Because the recipro-
cating parts of locomotives were lightened, and their counter-
balance was improved, the damage they once inflicted on rails by
producing rhythmic bumps had become of minor importance by
1938.12 ICC data indicate a downward trend in the number of ties
10Ourbrief and incomniete account is founded in large part on the comprehensive
review, 'A Quarter Century of Railroading Brings Many Changes in Maintenance
and Construction', Railway Engineering and Maintenance, June 1941, pp. 396—421.
11JohnV. Neubert, Chief Engineer, Maintenance of Way, New York Central Rail-
road, Official Proceedings, New York Railway Club, Jan. 1938, pp. 101 if.
12D.S. Ellis, Chief Mechanical Officer, Chesapeake and Ohio, p. 24, and H. 11.208 CHAPTER 7
laid in replacement, beginning in 1920, and in the tonnage of rails
laid beginning about 1926. Treatment of track bolts with heat
diminished their tendency to stretch under strain; springier
washers of alloy steel held them firmer; the heavy repetitive chore
of tightening them in the track was alleviated. Substitution of soft
for hard boiler water, or chemical treatment of hard water, pre-
vented corrosion and thereby diminished repairs to locomotive
flues and Heaters eliminated the need for loosening up
frozen switches.
The performance of maintenance work was largely mechanized.
Cranes, power shovels, tractors, conveyors, clamshell buckets,
drag-line scoops, bulldozers, spreaders pushed by locomotives, and
dump cars took over many bulky jobs—keeping ditches deep, re-
moving, cleaning and placing ballast, unloading and laying rails,
clearing away snow. Great forces of trackmen laboring with picks,
hand shovels, pitchforks or tongs were no longer needed. Other
operations were quickened by the invention of tools guided by
hand but driven by compressed air from portable field generators
or by other sources of power. Pneumatic tie tampers, employed
on the New York Central in 1913, apparently led the way.'4 They
not only prodded the ballast into position under the ties with less
labor but did a more permanent job.'5 Power-driven spike drivers,
spike pullers, rail saws, adzers, wrenches, hammers, rivet cutters,
drills, jacks, rotary brushes, and paint sprayers followed. Tools of
this family found uses not only in maintenance of track, bridges,
and buildings but also in repair of rolling Chemicals and
flame throwers superseded hand pulling and hoeing in the control
of weeds; mowing machines, instead of scythes, cut the grass along
the roadside. Gangs traveled from task to task on rail motor cars
and later in highway trucks; they arrived more quickly and free
Clarke, Engineer, Maintenance of Way, Burlington railroad, pp. 33—4, Official Pro-
ceedings,Western Railway Club, March 1938.
13T.F. Powers, Assistant Superintendent, Motive Power and Machinery, Chicago
and North Western, also M. A. Novak, General Boiler Inspector, Milwaukee rail-
road, Western Club, Dec. 1930, pp. 14ff.
14Onpneumatic equipment in general, see W. H. Armstrong, Manager of Tie
Tamper Sales, Ingersoll-Rand Co., N.Y. Club, April 1929.
15Confirmedby William Elmer, Special Engineer, Pennsylvania railroad, com-
ment, pp. 8883—4,011 Armstrong.
16ILH. Johnson, Assistant Vice-President, Ingersoll-Rand Co., N. Y. Club, May
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from the fatigue induced by working the levers of the old-fashioned
hand car.'7
Table 66
lATorkers for Whom Days are Reported: Average Number, 1929
Executives, officers, chief clerks, foremen, supervisors, etc.3 66,448
Auditors, investigators, inspectors, etc.b 9,293
Professional workers, traffic agents, etc.° 20,991
Messengers and office boysd 6,168
Crossing and bridge fiagmen and gatemen3 20,602
Total 123,502
a Occupationaldivision numbers included, classification prevailing in 1929: 1, 2,7,
8,21,24,34, 35, 54, 55, 61, 62, 63, 64,91, 93,99, 126.
b Divisions17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 65, 66, 120.
cDivisions3, 4, 5,6, 25.
d Division19.
Division 124.
OVERHEAD JOBS WERE HIGHLY REGULAR
So far we have not examined the relation between traffic and the
work of that relatively small group of employees for whom days
rather than hours were reported. For many of them that relation
must be remote. About half (66,000), in 1929, were engaged in
supervisory tasks at some level, high or low (Table 66). Presum-
ably a railroad company needs a president at all times, a yard-
master as long as a yard is open. Thirty thousand were investi-
gators and experts of one kind or another, doubtless trained and
skilled men with whom their superiors would be reluctant to part.
Six thousand were messengers and office boys; in each of many
departments, the number was probably quite small and therefore
not gradually variable. Crossing watchmen and the like made a
sizeable group. Even if the number of trains passing a highway
intersection is cut from 20 to 10 a day it is still desirable to keep
thereth .d.
of 'daily' workers were rather steady, the aggregate amount of their
services required did not vary in proportion to traffic. Man-days
paid for per million traffic units diminished in every expansion,
J.J..t kOiLi/
Someof the innovations we mention were in fairly common use before 1920 and
probably none had been adopted universally by 1938. But it is clear from the






Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
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Table 67
Days Paid for, Workers for whom Days are Reported
Percentage Change during Specific Phases, 1923—1938
Date ofturn Nov.Aug.Mar.Dec.Aug.Apr.JuneJuly
1923 1924192719281929 193319371938
Level of days paidPeakTroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeakTrough
for
Number of 3,3623,299 3,3913,3083,413 2,2372,4012,223
(thousands)
% changefrom...—1.87 2.79—2.45 3.17—34.467.33—7.41
preceding date
f Three-monthaverage; date ofturn is middle month.
Consideration of the full fluctuation between 'specific' turns
does not alter the picture. The expansions and contractions in
daily work itself were much smaller, percent agewise, than those in
traffic (Table 67; cf. Table 54) •18Theywere considerably smaller
than those in the number of 'hourly' men (Table 54, last column).
Comparison with the aggregate hours worked by the latter, or
paid for, would indicate an even more striking contrast.
LABOR COST VARIED INVERSELY WITH VOLUME
Since the number of man-hdurs and man-days required per unit
of traffic, in all occupations collectively, tended to decline in ex-
pa.nsion and rise in contraction, one might expect that expendi-
tures for labor, per traffic unit, would vary similarly. Indeed this
would necessarily be true if there were no changes in the relative
amounts of work paid for at high rates and at low rates, or in the
wage rates themselves. But we know that the ratio of overtime
paid for at punitive rates to total time tended to vary directly with
traffic. The effect on cost of cyclical fluctuations in requirements
per unit must be counteracted to some extent by the opposite fluc-
tuations in the percentage of overtime. Two of the important
changes in wage rates during the period our monthly employment
data cover tended also to offset the effect of changes in produc-
tivity. Late in the 1929—32 contraction rates were cut 10 percent.
:aU untU
afterthe corresponding change in traffichad begun (Chart 88).The same number
of days, 3,250,000, were worked in June 1924, the traffic trough, and August. We
place the turn in days at the latter month in accordance with our uniform if arbi-
trary rule. For the same reason we place a peak in days 8 months after the traffic
peak of 1926, although they were equally numerous 4 months after it.212 CHAPTER 7
During the following expansion the reduction was eliminated. De-
spite counter-effects, however, the ratio of aggregate compensation
of labor to traffic decreased in every expansion, increased in every
contraction except 1929—32 (Chart 89). Even in that phase, there
was an upward general slope until near the end, and the average
at the traffic trough, .5534 cents, was oniy a trifle below that at
the peak, cents.
CHART89












Important readjustments of wages occurred in two other phases,
1921—23 and 1937—38. In these the alterations of rates tended to
reenforce the effect on cost of cyclical changes in productivity
rather than to oppose it. In 1937—38, however, cost would have
risen, as in other contractions, even if the wage rates had not been
raised, for the increases in the latter averaged roughly 8 percent,
while the rise in unit cost was 19 percent. In the expansion
of 1921—23, unit cost would have fallen without the rate cuts. They
were equivalent to something like a 7 percent reduction for all oc-
cupations; the fall in unit labor cost was 15 percent.'9
As noted previously, the aggregate compensation figures which
we here divide by traffic units include a rising percentage of capital
expenditure in expansion, a falling percentage in contraction. If
such outlays, not chargeable to operations, could be excluded, the
19Changesin rates of pay will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 9.
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cyclical variation in unit labor expense would prove to be even
more pronounced than it appears to be on Chart 89. We would
probably find a net rise even in 1929—32.
PRODUCTIVITY ROSE FROM CYCLE TO CYCLE
Although traffic units per man-hour rose and fell in rough corre-
spondence with aggregate traffic, equal volumes of traffic in differ-
ent cycles were not accompanied by equal output-input ratios. On
the contrary, wherever we can compare a stage of one cycle with
a stage of an earlier cycle in which volume was about the same or
even somewhat larger, we find that output per man-hour was
greate.r in the later cycle (Chart 90). In the last two stages of
1929—32, the ratio of traffic units to man-hours was much higher
than in any stage of 1921—24, although volume was much lower.
The curve of the relation between productivity and aggregate
traffic appears to lie at a higher level in each expansion than in
the preceding expansion, and in each contraction than in the pre-
ceding contraction. These data suggest what a detailed survey of
changes in railway plant, equipment, and operating methods
would doubtless confirm: in the 1920's and '30's the number of
man-hours that would have been needed to handle a constant
volume of traffic was steadily diminishing.
Recognition of the role played by these changes does not destroy
the value of our previous finding that output per man rose in ex-
pansions. On first thought one might attribute the rises to im-
provements in the art of railroad transport rather than to growth
of traffic. But on this interpretation there should have been in-
creases in contractions too. When traffic diminishes new methods
are not forgotten, improved plant and equipment do not disap-
pear. Indeed the railroads then have an opportunity to conduct
wf.th the of better and machinery
only.2° The volume of business is no lonper so t,h
archaic facilities must be pressed into emergency service. Yet out-
put per man-hour declined. We must infer that it is affected by
volume, independently of technical change. If so, the growth of
c-P ,,,....
.---, .
.. - - V U Jt
Duringa depression the Erie, for example, studied the wage, fuel, and mainte-
nance costs of various locomotives, and put the most expensive engines in storage.
Robert E. Woodruff, System Operating Vice-President, Official Proceedings, New
York Railway Club, Sept. 1930, p. 9298.214 CHAPTER 7
rise of productivity in expansions. There would have been some
increase in product per hour even if technology had been station-
ary. In phases of rising traffic, volume and technology reenforced
each other; in contractions, they opposed each other, and shrink-
ing traffic was more powerful. Without developments in technique
the cyclical rises in output per man-hour would have been smaller









Traffic Units per Man-hour Worked, and Aggregate Traffic Units;
Averages for Stages of Cycles in Aggregate Traffic Units, 1921—1938
Aggregate traffic units (billions)
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Annual figures on the number of workers enable us to compute
cruder measures of productivity for a longer period (Chart 9121).
21Numberof workers (divisor) is average of year-end figures for 1914 and prior
years; thereafter the ICC average of several counts during year. Number at end
of 1913 from Table 53. Years before 1905 not shown because traffic never subse-
quently receded to pre-1905 amounts.
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In 1915—17 the level of the relation between traffic units per man
and aggregate volume was apparently higher than in preceding
expansions, although lack of a substantial overlap between the
ranges of traffic somewhat impairs one's confidence in such a con-
clusion. Introduction of the 8-hour day after 1918 caused a general
drop in level from 1915—18 to 1919—20. Thereafter the upward
shift was resumed. The 1921—23 section of the curve, at least in
its later portion, lies above 1919—20, and 1923—24 lies above
1920—21. The curve for the latter part of 1924—26 looks like a pro-
jection of that for 1915—17: the loss in output per man resulting
from the 8-hour day seems to have been regained. Although traffic
in 1932 was less than in 1908, product per worker was much
greater.
CHART 91
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Before 1921 expansion usually created more jobs than were lost
in the preceding contraction. For example, 1,699,000 men were at
work on June 30, 1910; the number fell to 1,670,000 on the next
June 30 but rose to about 1,831,000 on June 30, 1913 (Table 52).
After 1921 this was no longer true. On the average there were
2,023,000 workers on Class I railways in 1920; for the three peak
months in 1923 the average was only 1,843;000. And this com-
parison understates the difference, for, although we do not know
the number in the three peak months of 1920, it was undoubtedly
higher than the average for the entire year. The 1926 peak was
below 1923, 1929 was below 1926, 1937 far below 1929 (Chart 75).
In the old days experience suggested that after a contraction there
would be more jobs than ever; in more recent times this consoling.
prospect was lost.
The. reason is to be found in a combination of circumstances.
Traffic itself no longer surpassed previous records by any wide mar-
gin; in 1937 it notably failed to reach them (Ch. 1—3). Meanwhile
changes in the art of railroading made it possible to handle any
specified volume of traffic with fewer men than the same traffic
would have required some years earlier. Similar changes in tech-
nique were in progress long before 1921, but traffic at each peak
exceeded its previous peak level so greatly that any effect of tech-
nological progress on employment was more than offset by the
growth of business, except perhaps in 1920, when the increase in
the number of workers over 1918 might not have occurred without
the reduction in hours. (It is also possible that there was some
reduction in hours per worker between earlier peaks.) After 1920,
on the other hand, the expansion of traffic went so little beyond
preceding high levels, even when it did not end below them, that
it was no longer sufficient to offset the effect of changes in tech-
nique.
Some of the technological innovations that reduced unit labor
requirements in the operations of road trains and in maintenance
work were discussed in Chapter 4 and in preceding sections of this
chapter. Progress occurred in other departments also; for example,
iii yard work. Where freight cars are formed into trains by letting
them roll down a gradual slope, switches must be thrown to guide
them to the proper track. Originally a number of men on the
ground performed this task, but at some time before 1909 an
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electro-pneumatic system made it possible for a single towerman
pressing buttons to handle it.22Meanwhilea rider was still needed
on each cut of cars; he controlled the speed at which it moved by
manipulating the brakes on the vehicles. At many yards, however,
car retarders now do away with this dangerous job. They are
brakes on the ground; when activated from the tower they squeeze
the passing wheels. First employed at Gibson Yard near Chicago
in 1924, they were in use at seven other yards in May 1927 and
were being installed in four others.23 In their voluminous office
work the railroads have benefited from the numerous familiar in-
ventions in the field of stenographic and bookkeeping machinery.
The upward trend in the length of hauls and journeys has prob-
ably contributed to the decline in unit labor requirements. Often
it is just as easy to make out a waybill or sell a ticket for a long
movement as for a short one, no harder to switch a car from its
loading point to a road train or from the latter to the unloading
point if the two points are 500 miles apart than if they are 50 miles
apart. Longer movements must, however, have increased the num-
ber of intermediate terminal handlings per shipment and the
amount of interline accounting per shipment or passenger, but
perhaps not in proportion to distance.
THE QUALITY OF LABOR
Trained reserves in. recent cycles
The virtually continuous improvement in productivity during ex-
pansions of traffic after 1920, and the absence of a consistent re-
tardation toward their ends, can perhaps be explained in part at
least by the fact that the companies did not have much occasion
to take on 'green hands' in this period. In earlier cycles, the in-
crease in aggregate labor requirements above previous peaks
meant that many new workers had to be trained in railway duties.
But during the postwar era to which our stage-by-stage figures
pertain, the number of persons who had worked on a railroad at
some time in the recent past must at all times have exceeded the
22A survey of 27 yards in that year revealed 3 with remote control. American Rail-
way Engineering Association, Proceedings, 1909,Vol.10, Part I, pp. 278—314.
23W. B. Rudd, Union Switch and Signal Co., Official Proceedings, N. Y. Club, May
1927, p. 8347.218 CHAPTER7
number currently wanted. Of course, some of the men released in
depression drifted into other employments and could not be en-
ticed back; some died or became disabled. Nevertheless, the com-
panies must have been able to fill their needs during expansion by
rehiring their own former employees to a much greater extent
than industries whose volume of business exceeded previous
records by wider margins.
Older workers more likely to keep• their jobs in contractions
Cyclical variations in traffic are probably accompanied by changes
in the average age of railway employees. Because of seniority rules
the older workers on each seniority roster are the last to be dis-
missed when traffic falls off; when the need for personnel rises, the
men who come back or the new men who are taken on are likely
to be younger than those already on the job.24 Even in the absence
of formal rules, managements would probably be inclined to keep
their more experienced workers when employees must be dis-
missed; although they are perhaps inclined to dismiss those who
are also more decrepit.
Little statistical information on this question is available. The
Railroad Retirement Board ascertained the distribution by age of
workers on thirteen railroads as of July 1, 1924, July 1, 1929, and
December 31, 1933. We can therefore observe the net change in
composition during two successive intervals. The dates do not
coincide, it is true, with our traffic turns. In the first instance they
do not even belong in the same phase, for we find an expansion
from 1924 to 1926, a contraction to 1927, and another expansion
to 1929. Nevertheless, traffic was about 13 percent higher on July
1, 1929 than five years earlier, and we can regard the period as
one of net expansion. Likewise the interval from the second date
to the third may be regarded as one of net contraction.
During both periods employment was affected by technological
change as well as by the volume of business. This is obvious from
1924 to 1929, for although traffic increased, employment declined
slightly, both on all roads and on the thirteen roads in the sample.
The fall was concentrated in the younger age groups: the number
of workers under 25 declined substantially, the number from 25
24Ofcourse one man can be senior to another with respect to past employment
and yet younger; but on the whole seniority must be related to age.Nevertheless, the younger groups maintained their relative
...L1......4. 4......,.....41... .. ,-. + +
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It does not necessarily follow that a considerable proportion of the younger
people at work in 1924 had lost their jobs by 1929. In five years many of them may
simply have moved up into higher age groups. But it does suggest that rathet
few young people were taken on.
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to 34 somewhat.25 The four age groups over 34 all increased
(Table 68).
Table 68
Workers in Various Age Groups


































































From Railroad Retirement Board, Annual Report, 1937, p. 66.
be about a 20 percent sample of all railroad employment.
CHART 92
Workers inEach Age Group: Per-









The ratio of workers under 25 and workers 25—34 to all workers
declined much more rapidly in 1929—33 than in 1924-29 (Chart
92). The ratio of each of the four age groups over 34 to the total
inercased more rapidly in contraction than in expansion. The data
strongly suggest that the average age tends to fall in expansion
and rise in contraction.
If we had continuous figures on average age they would proba-.
bly show for some or all of the expansions, 1921—23, 1924—26, and
1927—29, what the 1924—29 data imply—that the average rose, but
more gradually than in contraction. After 1920 (to repeat) traffic
did not grow very rapidly, while technological change continued.
Prior to 1920 there was also much technological change; but traffic
increased more rapidly and probably more than offset the effect
of improved facilities on age composition. In those earlier days
the working force probably became, on the average, younger in
expansions •26Whatsignificance the figures may have for the pro-
ductivity of labor is debatable. It depends on the importance of
the supposed vigor and inventiveness of youth, on the one hand,
and the supposed advantages of long training and experience, on
the other. About such matters we are not in a position to say any-
thing that would be both new and true. Meanwhile, the data have
some independent interest in suggesting the effect of contraction
on the opportunities available in old industries to young people
who arrive at working age in hard times.
26Thisis what happened when traffic once more surpassed preceding high levels
in World War II. In 1941 it exceeded all previous records; in 1942 it was much
greater. Employment in 1940 was somewhat smaller than in 1937; the median age
was 42.1 years. In 1941, however, the average number of workers was greater than
in any preceding year later than 1931, and the median fell to 39.7. Further growth
of employment from 1941 to 1942 was accompanied by a continued decline of the
median to 38.5. Railroad Retirement Board, Annual Report, 1942, p. 124; 1943,
p. 45; 1944, p. 62.